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GOLDEN PARACHUTES: DOES THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE SIMPLY PERPETUATE THE
PROBLEM?
I. INTRODUCTION
A corporate takeover is pending. Tensions run high for
the employees of the target corporation who do not know if
they will even be employed in the following months. The dy-
namic stock market thrives with investors trying to predict the
effect of the merger on the corporation's stock and the indus-
try at large. A loyal stockholder waits with anticipation, sup-
portive yet ignorant of the complexities surrounding the pend-
ing change. When the dust settles, the stockholder discovers
that his corporation's top executives have voluntarily terminat-
ed their employment for jobs elsewhere. As a result, these
executives, who hold golden parachutes,' receive hundreds of
thousands of dollars each in addition to their already substan-
tial salaries, and the loyal stockholder feels "ripped-off." To his
dismay, the stockholder discovers that he has no recourse.
There are no' statutes addressing this situation, and the courts,
he finds, pursue a policy of deference to corporate directors
through the business judgment rule.' The stockholder's per-
sonal loss is not significant, but seeing the substantial gain
enjoyed by the executive, he knows it is wrong. Nonetheless,
pursuit of an action against these people would be futile so
nothing is done.
And so the controversy surrounding golden parachutes
evolves. Some commentators argue that golden parachutes
serve as security for desperate executives, while providing for
continuity and objectivity in the management of a corpora-
tion.3 Others contend that these arrangements constitute cor-
© 1991 by Mark A. Heyl.
1. Golden parachutes are special termination agreements given to key corpo-
rate executives as compensation in the event that they are terminated following a
change of control of the corporation. See infin notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
This concept is discussed in more depth in the next section of this comment.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 57-64.
3. Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 1266, 256 Cal. Rptr.
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porate waste by dredging shareholders' pocketbooks in the
midst of a hectic corporate reorganization.4 Over the last de-
cade these debates have essentially remained unresolved.
Eventually, the issue is raised whether the business judg-
ment rule is the proper standard of review for the conduct of
"disinterested" corporate decision makers. This comment will
begin by discussing the arguments surrounding golden para-
chutes and how these agreements have been handled by the
legislature and judiciary thus far. It will then discuss the in-
side/outside director distinction5 and the adoption of golden
parachutes in these corporate circles. Finally, this comment will
ascertain whether the business judgment rule is the proper
instrument by which to measure the propriety of a golden
parachute agreement. Concluding that it is not the proper in-
strument in its present form, the comment will provide guide-
lines that are more appropriate for judging the propriety of
adopted golden parachute agreements.
II. BACKCROUND
A. Golden Parachutes Generally
Golden parachutes are termination agreements that typi-
cally provide key corporate executives with lump-sum or in-
stallment payments in the event of a change of control6 of the
corporation.' These agreements are different than traditional
employment agreements inasmuch as they "pay off' only in the
event of a change of control.' Although their terms vary
702, 712 (1989).
4. International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1459 (111h Cir. 1989).
5. Aln inside director is a director who has some interest in tile corporation
which is personal and/or financial, to the extent that lie is an employee, officer
or major stockholder of the corporation. An outside director is a non-employee
director with little or no direct interest in the corporation lie serves. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 239 (5th ed. 1983).
6. It is important to distinguish between a "takeover" (which is the simple
change of control in the interest of a corporation) and a "leveraged buy-out,"
which is another form of corporate change of control in which a company's
management uses borrowed money to buy up the corporate stock from the share-
holders. Gaillad, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1266, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
7. Note, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcoids, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955
(1987) [hereinafter Note, Goklen Parachutes].
8. Such changes of control are usually by way of mergers or acquisitions.
When a change of control takes place, especially in the case of a hostile takeover,
many of the target corporation's executives are treated like corporate refuse and
[Vol. 31
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among corporations and depend substantially upon who will
receive the compensation, golden parachutes typically include
such benefits as guaranteed annual basic salary and bonuses
for a specified number of years, easing or removal of stock
option restrictions,9 accelerated or automatic vesting of pen-
sions, and retirement and medical plans." Nonetheless, all
golden parachutes can be broken down into three distinct
general parts or provisions.
1. General Provisions
Golden parachute agreements contain three distinctive
components: (1) a change of control clause, (2) a termination
clause, and (3) a compensation clause." The change of con-
trol clause makes the golden parachute operative in the event
of shift in the ownership control of the corporation, such as by
acquisition or merger." The termination clause describes the
circumstances under which the executive may terminate or be
terminated from his employment following a change of con-
trol.' While all termination clauses are triggered in the event
of an involuntary termination, some agreements allow the
subsequently lose their jobs. Comment, Golden Parachutes and Draconian Measures
Aimed At Controk Is Internal Revenue Code Section 280G The Proper Regulatoiy Mode
Of Shareholder Protection?, 54 CIN. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1986) [hereinafter Comment,
Draconian Measures] (authored by Dana M. Leonard).
9. In the course of employment, a corporation may grant stock options to
its employees as incentives for future performance. A "stock option" gives the
possessor the right to purchase or sell the stock of a corporation at a specified
price within a specified period of time. The option is an incentive for future
performance in that if the company's value increases, which is reflected in the
value of its stock, the value of the stock option will increase as well. As such, it is
anticipated that the employee will work harder to increase the value of the com-
pany.
10. Hood & Benge, Golden Parachute Agreements: Reasonable Compensation or
Disguised Btibety?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 199, 202-03 (1985). Regarding the areas of
the article by Hood & Benge cited to in this comment, such article primarily uses
Morrison, Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1982, at 82, and Com-
ment, Golden Parachutes - Executive Compensation or Executive Overreaching?, 9 J.
CORP. L. 346 (1984) as authority cited.
11. Note, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Towarl a Proper
Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909, 910 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Business Judg-
ment].
12. "Typically, a change of control is defined as an outside party's acquisition
of a certain percentage of stock or as a change in the composition of the board
of directors." Id. at 911.
13. See also Note, Golden Parachutes, supra note 7, at 957 n.11.
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executive to leave either unconditionally or under certain spe-
cific circumstances. 4 The compensation clause provides for
the amount, method and duration of payment to the corporate
executive, which can be distributed in either lump-sum or in-
stallment form.
15
2. Justifications for Golden Parachutes
The most basic rationale for providing a golden parachute
agreement is to compensate the executive for losses suffered
from displacement of his job, which include its psychological
benefits of power and prestige, and for costs incurred in the
search for a new job." Yet while this rationale seems sound
facially, some contend that it does not justify the enormous
sums actually received by way of golden parachute agreements.
Recent history, however, helps shed some light on the devel-
opment of the golden parachute.
During the last decade, mergers and acquisitions have
become increasingly common. 7 In fact, the number of corpo-
rate takeovers in recent years is unprecedented." Generally,
about half of a target corporation's top management leave the
company within three years following a takeover. Termination
may be voluntary or involuntary, but because of the high num-
ber of takeovers, today's corporate management has a strong
incentive to protect itself in the event of a change of con-
trol.'9 While goals such as self-protection would otherwise be
attacked as illegitimate, advocates have proposed three legiti-
14. See Note, Business Judgment, supra note 11, at 911-12. See also Note, Golden
Parachutes, supra note 7, at 957 n.12.
15. See Note, Business Judgment, supra note 11, at 912. See also Note, Golden
Parachutes, supra note 7, at 957 n.13.
16. See Note, Business Judgment, supra note 11, at 912 n.16.
17. "Mergers between 1979 and 1985 grew at an annual rate of 19%, com-
pared to a 6.9% growth rate between 1948 and 1979." McGee, Meige)S and Acquisi-
tions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 665, 665 (1989).
18. Generally, factors which have led to the increase in corporate takeovers
include "the general deregulatory environment, fierce foreign competition and a
change in viewpoint by the Federal Trade Commission. Nich merger activity has
occurred in the oil, banking, finance, insurance and transportation industries due
to deregulation. Other mergers have been triggered by competitive pressures." See
McGee, supra note 17, at 665. For a general discussion on the effect of golden
parachute agreements in the context of the merger/acquisition environment, see
McGee, supra note 17, at 676-78.
19. See McGee, supra note 17, at 676.
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mate theories to provide justification for the adoption of gold-
en parachute agreements.
a. Compensation
First, golden parachutes are said to foster an objective
state of mind in the executive since he does not have to worry
about his personal finances. As a result, he is in a better posi-
tion to serve the best interests of the shareholders." Essen-
tially, proponents argue that the golden parachutes eliminate
any conflict of interest that might otherwise arise during a
takeover in the absence of such an agreement.2 Opponents
contend that golden parachutes do more than ease executive
tension. They say that the agreements go so far as to create a
lackadaisical or apathetic attitude on the part of the executive,
since he will be financially secure regardless of the outcome of
the takeover.2" In fact, some executives may actually encour-
age a takeover that is not in the best interests of the sharehold-
ers if the executives stand to profit greatly from payments
tendered under the provisions of their golden parachute agree-
ments.
23
b. Attract and Retain Key Executives
Second, proponents argue that golden parachutes help
companies attract key executives and retain them in the face of
a takeover battle." As such, the agreements benefit the cor-
poration and the shareholders by assuring stability within the
20. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 205.
21. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 205-06.
22. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 206.
23. See McGee, supra note 17, at 678; Note, Business Judgment, supra note 11,
at 918 n.45. A situation could easily arise in which an executive, by opposing a
takeover, would simply continue to work for the corporation at a comfortable
annual salary. However, with the presence of a golden parachute agreement, the
executive may benefit friom a takeover and the termination of his employment
insofar as he would receive, by lump sum, the proceeds provided by the agree-
ment which may exceed three or four times his former annual salary. As long as
the executive is successful in obtaining employment with another company within
a reasonable time period and for a comparable salary, then he will actually benefit
to some extent by his change of employment. To this cnd, the executive may
actually support a takeover that is not in the best interests of the corporation or
its shareholders if he is confident that future employment can be found.
24. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 204.
1991]
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leadership of the corporation.25 Two reasons are presented to
support this contention. First, since golden parachutes have
become so popular among corporations, advocates believe that
a corporation will fight to lure top executives away from their
present companies unless the executives are given the security
of such an agreement. Likewise, the possibility exists that com-
panies will lose their own top executives unless they adopt
golden parachute agreements as well. 26 Second, golden para-
chutes provide managerial stability in the face of a takeover
since without such an agreement, a top executive may be in-
clined to discontinue his employment in the middle of the
takeover battle, thereby leaving the corporation without leader-
ship when it is most needed. The manager may leave in an,
effort to seek employment that is more secure in light of the
likelihood of termination following a successful corporate take-
over.
27
Opponents point out that top executives are well compen-
sated for the risk of job loss and that such risks are an inher-
ent part of every employment relationship, yet most employees
are not provided the luxury of a golden parachute. 2s In addi-
tion, the risk of a top executive leaving his job during difficult
times is unlikely, since company loyalty, personal pride, and
the potential for an unfavorable reputation serve to keep top
executives where they are. 29
c. Defense Against Takeovers
Third, proponents claim that golden parachutes serve as a
deterrent to unwanted takeover attempts by increasing the cost
25. See Comment, Draconian Measures, supra note 8, at 1296.
26. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 204.
27. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 204. See also supra text accompany-
ing note 19 (illustrating the extreme rate of executive employment termination
following a corporate takeover).
28. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 204-05. A corresponding argument
is that the danger of job loss is particularly prevalent for corporate management
in the takeover situations. This type of job loss is not inherent in every job, and
golden parachutes are adopted to provide additional compensation to this extent
in the event of job loss.
29. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 205. It may also be the case that
even the most selfish of corporate executives, who would not otherwise be affect-
ed by the consideration of loyalty or personal pride since they may be without
either, may still consider the financial aspects of an unfavorable reputation incen-
tive enough to remain loyal to their corporation during troubled times.
[Vol. 31
GOLDEN PARACHUTES
of the takeover. Costs increase insofar as the new owners
would be obligated to honor the terms of the golden para-
chute entered into prior to the takeover.30 Critics, however,
point out that takeover t.osts are so high to begin with that the
added cost of the agreements are inconsequential."' The rela-
tive cost of a golden parachute agreement to the aggressor cor-
poration is typically less than one percent of the total cost of
the takeover, so that while the cost of compensating managers
who possess golden parachute agreements may seem quite
large, it is relatively small to the acquiring corporation. 2 Ac-
cordingly, recent commentary suggests that golden parachutes
do not serve as any significant deterrent at all.3" Most of the
commentary regarding golden parachute agreements has been
highly critical of their use. But in order to fully appreciate the
scope of golden parachute utility, the legislative and judicial
treatment of these agreements must be considered.
B. Tax Treatment of Golden Parachutes
Before the courts had addressed the validity of golden
parachutes, Congress enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984 s4 which provided for the adverse tax treatment of cer-
tain payments made under golden parachute agreements. Prior
to this act, golden parachutes were considered a business ex-
pense and therefore fell within the provisions of section
162(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. 5 This particular sec-
tion provides that any reasonable payments made for purposes
of compensation for services are tax deductible as a business
30. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 205.
31. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 205.
32. See generally Comment, Golden Parachutes: Ripcords or Rip Offs?, 20 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 237, 254-56 (1986).
33. See Note, Golden Parachutes, supra note 7, 958 n.15. But see Note, Golden
Parachutes, supra note 7, 974 n.91. The court in Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 208 Cal.
App. 3d 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1989) (lid not choose to recognize this deter-
rence as a legitimate justification at all. Id. at 1266, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 712. Keep
in mind that this point represents only one part of this controversy, anti while it
may reflect a small victory for opponents, much of the topic remains unsettled.
34. See Comment, Draconian Measures, supra note 8, at 1299; "Division A of
the Deficit and Reduction Act, entitled the Tax Reform Act of 1984, added
sections 280G and 4999 to the 1954 I.R.C." See Comment, Draconian Measures,
supra note 8, at 1298 n.42 (citing The Deficit and Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 678 (1984)).
35. See Comment, Draconian Measures, supra note 8, at 1297-98.
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expense if they are "ordinary and necessary."36 Section 162
uses a subjective standard of review inasmuch as the courts
address each situation on a case by case analysis.37 Although
this reasonable relationship standard of review for tax deduc-
tions is quite different from the strict, objective standard pro-
vided for by sections 280G"8 and 499931 of the Internal
Revenue Code, section 162 is not superseded by these provi-
sions.4 ° In fact, sections 162(a)(1), 280G and 4999 apply to
golden parachute agreements enacted or amended in any sig-
nificant aspect after June 14, 1984 insofar as the agreement
must meet the requirements of all three codes in order to
receive any deductions. Those agreements adopted prior to
June 15, 1984, are not subject to the provisions of sections
280G and 4999.41
While section 280G disallows corporations from taking
golden parachute deductions allowed under section 162(a)(1),
section 4999 provides for a twenty percent excise tax imposed
on the recipient of a golden parachute payment paid by a
corporation disqualified for deductions under section 280G.42
Section 280G essentially provides that a corporation is disquali-
fied from taking a deduction under section 162(a)(1) of any
"excess parachute payment," which is that amount in excess of
the payee's "base amount" for such a payment.43 The payee's
36. "A corporation may deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred
in operating the business, 'including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered.'" See Comment, Draconian
Measures, supra note 8, at 1298 n.33 (quoting I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1982)). Reason-
able compensation is that amount normally paid to similar eniployees in like
situations. "Other factors courts consider relevant in determiinug reasonableness of
compensation include: (1) comparison with other competsultioi; (2) the nature and
extent of services rendered; (3) the net earnings of the corporation; (4) examina-
tion of the executive's previous compensation." See Comment, Draconian Measures,
supra note 8, at 1298 n.38.
37. See Comment, Draconian Measures, supra note 8, at 1298.
38. I.R.C. § 280G (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 67(a) of the Tax Reform
Act of 1984). For a detailed description of § 280G, see infra notes 43-47 and text
accompanying notes 42-47.
39. I.R.C. § 499 (West Supp. 1984) (added by § 67(b)(I) of the Tax Reform
Act of 1984).
40. See Comment, Draconian Measures, supra note 8, at 1298.
41. See Comment, Draconian Measures, supra note 8, at 1298-99 & n.40.
42. See Comment, Draconian Measures, supra note 8, at 1298.
43. See I.R.C. § 280G(a)(b)(1) which states: "(a) General rule.- No deduction
shall be allowed under this chapter for any excess parachute payment. [1] (b) Ex-
cess parachute payment defined.-[ ] (A) In general.- 'he term 'parachute payment'
1991] GOLDEN PARACHUTES 747
"base amount" is his average annualized compensation over
the preceding five years.44
"Parachute payments" are classified into two categories:
(1) any payment in the form of compensation which is triggered
by a change in control, the aggregate present value of which
equals or exceeds three times the payee's allocated base
amount;45 and (2) any payment in the form of compensation
which violates any generally enforceable securities laws or regu-
lations.46 Therefore, if the payee receives a parachute pay-
ment that is either three times his average gross income or any
amount in violation of a securities law or regulation,47 the
means an amount equal to the excess of any parachute payment over the portion
of the base amount allocated to such payment."
44. Id. at § 280G(b)(3)(A) which states: (3) Base amount.- [1] (A) In general.-
The term 'base amount' means the individual's annualized includible compensation
for the base period."
§ 280G(d)(2) states:
The term "base period" means the period consisting of the most
recent 5 years ending before the date on which the change in owner-
ship or control described in paragraph (2)(A) of subsection (b) occurs
(or such portion of such period during which the disqualified individ-
ual performed personal services for the corporation).
45. Id. at § 280G(b)(2)(A) which states:
(A) In general.- The term 'parachute payment' means any payment in
the nature of.compensation to (or for the benefit of) a disqualified
individual if- [I] (i) such payment is contingent on a change- [1] (1)
in the ownership or effective control of the corporation, or [11] (II) in
the ownership of a substantial portion of the assets of the corpora-
tion, and 11] (ii) the aggregate present value of the payments in the
nature of compensation to (or for the benefit of) such individual
which are contingent on such change equals or exceeds an amount
equal to 3 times the base amount. [ 1] For purposes of clause (ii),
payments not treated as parachute payments under paragraph (4)(A),
(5), or (6) shall not be taken into account.
46. Id. at § 280G(b)(2)(B) which states:
(B) Agreements.- The term 'parachute payment' shall also include any
payment in the nature of compensation to (or for the benefit of) a
disqualified individual if such payment is made pursuant to an agree-
ment which violates any generally enforced securities laws or regula-
tions. In any proceeding involving the issue of whether any payment
made to a disqualified individual is a parachute payment on account
of a violation of any generally enforced securities laws or regulations,
the burden of proof with respect to establishing the occurrence of a
violation of such a law or regulation shall be upon the Secretary.
47.
Under the Act, the term parachute payment also includes any
payment under a contract that (1) provides for payments of a type
which the Congress intended to discourage by enacting the new rules,
and (2) that violates any applicable securities laws or regulations.
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corporation will be excluded from any deduction for that part
of the payment that exceeds the recipient's average annualized
income. Likewise, under section 4999, the recipient will be
taxed at a rate of twenty percent for this amount.48
Congress intended to discourage the use of golden para-
chutes for several reasons. First, Congress felt that in "hostile"
takeover situations," golden parachutes are designed to dis-
suade an interested buyer from attempting a takeover by in-
However, the rules relating to reasonable comnpensation are not appli-
cable in determining how much of any such parachute payment is
excessive.
For this purpose, the Congress intended that applicable securi-
ties laws or regulations include State as well as Federal laws or regula-
tions. However, the Congress intended this rule to apply only if the
violation is a serious one. It was not intended to apply if the viola-
tion is merely technical in character or is not materially prejudicial to
shareholders or potential shareholders.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, H.R. No. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 199, 204-05 (1984).
48. I.R.C. § 4999(a), (b). This analysis of the tax code is very simplified and
does not necessarily reflect the precise regulation. But for purposes of this com-
ment, the general impact of the code sections on golden parachute agreements is
reflected by the preceding prose. To illustrate, appose Joe Executive makes a
modest annual salary of $100,000 as a vice presi'epit for XYZ Corp. Following a
friendly takeover that qualifies as the statutory change of control, he is terminated
from employment and receives a lump stum payment of $500,000. In this example,$100,000 is Joe's average annualized salary. (If he has been receiving raises over
the last five years, we would take an average to determine this amount; also, if
Joe is to receive many payments over a number of years, then the present value
of those payments would be calculated.) Joe's "base amount" is $100,000 and his
allowable parachute payment is three times that amount, which is $300,000. There-
fore, Joe's "excess parachute payment" is anything over $300,000, which is$200,000. As such, XYZ Corp. will not be allowed under § 280C to take a deduc-
tion on the $200,000 of excess parachute payment, and Joe will have a 20% excise
tax of $40,000 levied against him under § 4999 fo; the $200,000 received.
49. "A hostile takeover (aiming to replace existing managemnent) is usually at-
tempted through a public tender offer. Other approaches might be unsolicited
merger proposals to directors, accumulations of shares in the open market, or
proxy fights that seek to install new directors." J. DOWNES & J.E. GOODMAN,
BARRON'S FINANCE AND INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 410 (2d Ed. 1987). "A tender
offer is an attempt by one company to purchase the shares of a corporation
directly from the shareholder of that corporation. Such purchase offers are used
in an effort to purchase the corporation out f'om underneath the management."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1316 (5th ed. 1979). If tile tender offer is hostile, then
it is an attempt to takeover tihe corporation withott tIle consent of its manage-
ment. A friendly takeover is one that is done with the blessings of the incumbent
management.
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creasing the cost of the purchase.5" Congress stated that, as a
matter contrary to public policy, golden parachute agreements
that are intended to dissuade potential buyers should be
strongly discouraged since they hinder acquisition activity.
51
Congress was also concerned that the existence of these
agreements may actually encourage key executives to support a
takeover that is not in the best interest of the corporation and
shareholders in order to take advantage of the parachute pay-
ments. 5' Whether the agreement is made between the execu-
tive and the target corporation, the acquiring corporation, or
some other interested party, Congress determined that such
arrangements should be strongly discouraged.
3
Additionally, in theory, one presumes that a target corpo-
ration will be sold to the highest bidder, and that the target
corporation will attempt to negotiate the highest price the
purchaser can afford. To the extent that a portion of that
amount must be paid to the officers of the target corporation,
due to the existence of golden parachute agreements, there is
less for the shareholders of that corporation who are its own-
ers.54 Congress determined that such arrangements should be
discouraged.55
While Congress has attempted to reduce the excessive use
50.
In many 'hostile' takeover situations, the Congress believed that
such arrangements, commonly called 'golden parachute,' were de-
signed in part to dissuade an interested buyer, by increasing tile cost
of the acquisition, from attempting to proceed with the acquisition. If
the takeover did not occur, the target's executives and other key pet-
sonnel would more likely retain their positions, so the golden para-
chute could have had an effect of helping to preserve the jobs of
such personnel. Where no takeover bid yet commenced the Congress
believed that golden parachutes were oftentimes entered into to dis-
courage potential buyers from becoming interested. It was the view of
Congress that to the extent golden parachutes had the desired effect
in either such a case, they hindered acquisition activity in the market-
place and, as a matter of policy, should be strongly discouraged.
See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 47, at 199.
51. See supra note 7 & note 50 and accompanying text.
52. "In other situations, tihe Congress was concerned that the existence of
such arrangements tended to encourage the executives and other key personnel
involved to favor a proposed takeover that might not be in the best interests of
the shareholders or others." See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 47, at 199.
53. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 47, at 199-200.
54. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 47, at 200.
55. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 47, at 200.
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of golden parachutes by corporations with the enactment of
sections 280G and 4999, commentaries have suggested that the
tax code is not the proper channel through which to regulate
the use of golden parachutes. 6 Moreover, the courts have
failed to discourage the use of golden parachute agreements
through a deferential standard of review known as the business
judgment rule.
C. Business Judgment Rule
The common law "business judgment rule" is a judicial
policy of deference to the business judgment of corporate
directors who are said to be in a better position to make busi-
ness decisions than the courts.57 It is a policy of restraint that
gives corporate directors broad discretion in their decision
making. The rule is also premised on the notion that the
management of the corporation has been entrusted to make
such decisions, as opposed to the courts, and is better able to
judge whether a particular act or transaction serves the needs
and purposes of the corporation. 9 Managerial decisions are
presumed to be founded on sound business judgment." Un-
der this rule, a director will not be held liable for mistakes in
business judgment, if the mistakes are made in good faith and
the director believes that the decisions were made in the best
interest of the corporation.6'
The business judgment rule, however, is not one of abso-
lute immunity. The director cannot make unreasonable deci-
sions and expect to escape liability through the business judg-
ment rule." But while no court has, until recently, taken a
56. See Comment, Draconian Measures, supra note 8, at 1309.
57. Gaillard v. Natornas Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 1263, 256 Cal. Rptr.
702, 710 (1989).
58. International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (Ilth Cir.
1989).
59. Gaillard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1263, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
60. Id. "Courts have formulated this rule to safeguard tile corporate law
policy that assures stockholders tile right to vote directors out of office if they dis-
agree with their decisions." International hs. Co., 874 F.2d at 1458 n.20 (citing
Entesra Corp. v. SGS Associates, 600 F. Supp. 678, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1985)).
61. Gaillanl, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1263, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 710. Cf supna note
79 for California's business judgment rule codified in § 309 of its Corporate
Code.
62. Gaillarl, 208 Cal. App. 3(d at 1263-64, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 710. "Courts have
properly decided to give directors a wide latitude in tle muanagement of the
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-definitive position on the rule's application to golden para-
chute agreements, 3 commentators have generally predicted
that the rule will most likely govern their disposition.64 In
fact, following these predictions, two recent cases have applied
the business judgment rule to the use of golden parachute
agreements.65
D. Application of Business Judgment Rule to Golden Parachutes
Because the issue of executive compensation is fundamen-
tally a corporate business decision, and because golden para-
chutes often serve that valid corporate function, the court in
Gaillard v. Natomas Co.66 determined that such decisions are
governed by the business judgment rule.67 Likewise, the court
in International Ins. Co. v. Johns68 stated that in Florida the
business judgment rule governs judicial review of a board of
directors' decision to enact golden parachutes."
1. Gaillard v. Natomas Co.
Gaillard involved shareholder derivative actions in which
four inside directors 0  entered into golden parachute
affairs of a corporation provided always that judgment, and that means an honest,
unbiased judgment, is reasonably exercised by them ... ." Id. at 1264, 256 Cal.
Rptr. at 710 (quoting Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 852-53, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 392 (1965)).
63. Id. at 1265, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 711. See Brown %'. Ferro Corp., 763 F.2d
798 (6th Cir. 1985) (suit challenging corporation's enactment of golden parachutes
dismissed as not ripe); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163, 167
(3rd Cir. 1984) (question of management's breach of fiduciary duty in enacting
golden parachutes not properly before the court), affd, 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
64. Gaillaid, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1265 n.8, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 711 n.8. See
Note, Golden Parachutes, supa note 7, at 962, 956 n.6; Note, Business Judgment,
supra note 11, at 912.
65. These two cases are Gaillard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1263, 256 Cal. Rptr. at
710 (1989) and International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1458 n.20 (1tlh Cir. 1989),
decided March 23, 1989 and june 7, 1989, respectively.
66. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1989).
67. Id. at 1265, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
68. 874 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1989).
69. Id. at 1458.
70. These directors were also the corporation's five principal executive offi-
cers, which is why they are classified as "inside directors." Gaillasld, 208 Cal. App.
3d at 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 702. Outside directors are non-employee directors
with little or no direct interest in te corporation they serve. BLACK'S L-W DIC-
TIONARY 414 (5th ed. 1979). See supra note 5.
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agreements and one was provided with a four-year consultation
agreement in connection with a merger." Following a hostile
tender offer7" by Diamond Shamrock Corporation, which
eventually led to the friendly merger, Natomas' five inside di-
rectors prepared golden parachute agreements and presented
them to the board of directors compensation committee."
The inside directors asserted that these agreements were con-
ducive to the continuity of management." On the
committee's recommendation, the board of directors, of which
only the twelve outside directors voted, approved the golden
parachute agreements entitling the inside directors to eleven
million dollars in cash payments in the event of a change of
control and subsequent termination of employment.75
Subsequently, Natomas' shareholders approved the merg-
er, which included the golden parachutes and consultation
agreement.7 6 Shortly after the merger, the four key executives
who received the golden parachute agreements terminated
their employment, thus triggering lump sum payments totaling
about ten million dollars.77 In addition, the one inside direc-
tor who contracted for the consultation agreement spent less
than one day providing consultation services during the pre-
scribed four-year period, but received one million dollars for
his "services."78
The court applied California's business judgment rule 79
71. Gaillard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
72. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a definition of "hostile
tender offer."
73. See supra note 48.
74. See supra note 48. While the opinion does not go into any detail with re-
spect to this argument, the text indicates that with the help of outside counsel,
the inside directors convinced the conlittee that such arrangements were a
conlnlon method used to insure thaIt manageuent would remain focused ill its
duties to the corporation despite the pending takeover and ite possibility of job
loss that accompanied it. See infra text accompanying note 85. This rationale
corresponds to the justification of golden parachutes which indicates that golden
parachutes serve to retain key management by stabilizing their financial anxiety
during a takeover period.
75. See infr text accompanying note 85. The one director whose operation
was being spun off received a consultation agreement entitling hin to annual
payments of $250,000 for each of the four years following the merger. See iizra
text accompanying note 85.
76. Gallard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79.
Section 309 [of California's Corporate Code] (Stats. 1975, ch. 682, §
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to golden parachute agreements in the context of an appeal to
a motion for summary judgment which was granted against the
shareholder plaintiffs.8" As a result, the court's analytical
depth is shallow since the court was required only to find a
triable issue of fact by which the summary judgment could be
reversed.8" With respect to the inside directors, the court
found that since these directors were not performing as direc-
tors, but were admittedly acting in their own interest as indi-
viduals and employees, section 309, the business judgment
rule, did not apply to them. 2 As a consequence, the summa-
ry judgment in their favor was an error and therefore re-
versed."3
Because the record did not show any evidence of conflict
of interest or bad faith, the point of the inquiry regarding the
outside directors was whether they acted in a manner which
7, pp. 1537-1538, eft. Jan. 1, 1977) codifies California's business judg-
ment rule ... and provides '(a) A director shall perform the duties
of a director, including duties as a member of any committee of the
board upon which the director may serve, in good faith, in a manner
such director believes to be in the best interests of the coiporation and
with such care, including reasonable inquiby, as an ordinanily prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. [1] (b)
In performing the duties of a director, a director shall be entitled to
rely on information, opinions, reports or statements, including finan-
cial statements and other financial data, in each case prepared or
presented by: [1] (1) One or more officers or employees of the cor-
poration whom the director believes to be reliable and competent in
the matters presented, (1] (2) Counsel, independent accountants or
other persons as to matters which the director believes to be within
such person's professional or expert competence, or [ 1] (3) A commit-
tee of the board upon which the director does not serve, as to mat-
ters within its designated authority, which committee the director
believes to merit confidence, so long as in any such case, the director
acts in good faith, after reasonable inquiry when the neced therefore is
indicated by the circumstances and without knowledge that would
cause such a reliance to be unwarranted. [1] (c) A person who per-
forms the duties of a director in accordance with subdivisions (a) and
(b) shall have no liability based upon any alleged failure to discharge
the person's obligations as a director.
Id. at 1264, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 710 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
81. Id. at 1268, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
82. Id. "The record discloses issues of fact on appellants' claims of, inter alia,
breach of fiduciary duty and waste as to the five directors, which cannot be re-
solved as a matter of law on the basis of the record before us." Id.
83. Id.
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they believed to be in the best interest of the corporation, and
with such care as to include the reasonable inquiry of an ordi-
narily prudent person in a like position. 4
The court held that, as a matter of law, it could not find
that the compensation committee was justified in relying solely
on outside counsel's recommendation that the golden para-
chute agreements be adopted. 5 The golden parachute did
not serve any of the functions, stated above, 6 by which such
agreements are normally justified," and, as a matter of law,
the court found that the circumstances did not warrant further
inquiry.8 8  With respect to the consultation agreement
adopted by the board, the court did not find it determinative
that the particular director did not provide one million dollars'
worth of consultation. California's business judgment rule re-
quires that the court view the acts of the directors at the time
such decisions were made." The record indicates that the
compensation committee considered the need for the consult-
ing agreement, but decided that such agreement would serve a
valid and necessary purpose for Natoinas.90 As a result, the
court found that the outside directors were not liable, as a
matter of law, for their approval of the consultation agree-
84. Id. at 1269, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
85.
[The outside counsel] stated that continuity in management should be
a concern of the Natomas board and that the golden parachutes
would serve that purpose. [Counsel] did not explain, however, how
the purported golden parachutes would serve such purpose, and the
record does not indicate that any of the committee members request-
ed fiurther explanation of his conclusory opinion or analyzed among
themselves how such purpose would be served by the amendments.
Gaillard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1269, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 16-33.
87. Gaillard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1270, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 714. Gaillard sets
forth two of the three aforementioned justifications traditionally used to advocate
golden parachute agreements: "(1) to foster executive objectivity toward merger
and tender offers; and (2) to attract top executives to companies and industries
where the odds of takeover are high." Id. at 1266, 256 Cal. Rptr at 712. Appar-
ently, this court did not consider the third justification, use as a defense to an
unwanted takeover, adequate as such.
88. Id. at 1269, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 714. "The director who chaired the meeting
indicated that the committee relied entirely upon [outside counsel] when agreeing
to recommend the agreements." hi. See supra text accompanying note 84.
89. See Gaillard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1271, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
90. Id.
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ment.91
The court then turned to the conduct of the outside direc-
tors not on the compensation committee. The court stated that
although a director is normally entitled to rely on the recom-
mendations of a committee,92 the particular circumstances
and timing of these golden parachute proposals create a triable
issue of fact as to whether these directors exercised a level of
inquiry that a reasonable person in a like position would exer-
cise."3 In this case, the court found a triable issue as to wheth-
er these directors had knowledge as to the questionable and
controversial nature of golden parachutes such that it should
cause them to make further inquiry.9 '1
While this case helps to illustrate the line of inquiry neces-
sary to determine the validity of golden parachutes under the
business judgment rule, it does not provide a structured analy-
sis by which future cases can be modeled. 5 A more recent
case, however, has provided such an analysis.
2. International Ins. Co. v. Johns
International Ins. Co. v. Johns6 was a declaratory relief ac-
tion brought by International Insurance Company following
the settlement of a related shareholder's derivative suit.97 The
officers and directors involved in the prior action sought in-
demnification from International Insurance Company through
an insurance policy that covered them for losses resulting from
their wrongful acts committed within the scope of their em-
91. Id.
92. See supra note 76 & note 79 and accompanying text.
93.
Even as of the date of the merger, golden parachutes were highly
controversial [cite omitted]. The board nmembers, who presumably
were appointed to the board because of their business and financial
acumen, likely had, or should have had, some knowledge of this con-
troversy. The proposal of the golden parachutes here under somewhat
suspicious circumstances, i.e., after the tender offer and in the midst
of merger discussions, raises the question of whether these directors
should have examined the golden parachutes more attentively.
Gaillard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1272, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
94. Id. at 1272, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
95. The court's line of inquiry is limited because the court only needs to
make a factual inquiry for purposes of a summary judgment appeal.
96. 874 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1989).
97. Id. at 1447.
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ployment s The facts giving rise to these actions are as fol-
lows: As a result of substantial growth experienced by South-
west Florida Banks, Inc., Southwest's key officers expressed
concern about the possibility of a merger.9 Reacting to these
concerns, Southwest's board of directors unanimously adopted
a Performance Incentive Plan (PIP) in 19830 o This plan was
designed to retain managerial talent by offering compensation,
which was contingent and deferred, to key executives and full
time employees after a period of five years of service or upon
a change of control.'
Later that year, Southwest agreed to a merger which had
not been contemplated when PIP was originally adopted. 2
The merger agreement also included a five year consultation
agreement offered to defendant Johns, Southwest's former
chair to the board of directors.' As a result of the merger
and change of control, certain directors and key employees
received monetary awards under PIP. 4 These payments
gave rise to a lawsuit by a disgruntled shareholder.0 5
About one year after the payments were made, the parties
to the derivative action settled the action with the court's ap-
proval.'0 6 The terms of the settlement agreement included
the return of $600,000 paid under PIP and a reduction in the
term of Johns' consultation agreement from five years to two
years. 7 Following this settlement, the officers and directors
sought indemnification from International Insurance Company
through an insurance policy that covered them for losses re-
sulting from their wrongful acts committed within the scope of
their employment.' But while International approved of
and paid the pro rata share of the costs of defending the suit,
it denied coverage of the actual settlement payments and then
98. Id. at 1452.
99. Id. at 1450.
100. Id. at 1451.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The consultation agreement provided for a five year term at an annual
compensation rate of $225,000. Id.
104. Id. at 1452 & n.8.
105. Id. at 1452.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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brought this declaratory action to interpret the policy.
0 9
a. Foundation Requirements - Initial Obstacles to the
Application of the Business Judgment Rule
To begin, the court discussed two obstacles to the applica-
tion of the business judgment rule to golden parachute agree-
ments: (1) golden parachutes are sometimes used as a defense
tactic to corporate takeovers," ° and (2) when golden para-
chutes are awarded to members of the board who are inside
directors, issues of self-dealing arise."1 ' While a board's adop-
tion of a golden parachute is given a stricter review than that
ordinarily given under the business judgment rule,
self-interested transactions are seldom given any protec-
tion.'
2
As a result of their strong desire to protect themselves
from termination following a merger, top executives may face
a conflict of interest with the corporation's shareholders." 3
The conflict of interest results from their anxiety regarding
potential termination, their desire to "remain entrenched" and
their fiduciary duty of loyalty to act in the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders." 4 In fact, the directors are
109. 874 F.2d 1447 at 1452.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 29 & 30.
111. Intel7tational Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1458. Self-dealing is no more than a
self-serving act in the context of business dealings. This is to be distinguished
from those decisions that are made with the best interest of the corporation in
mind. Self-dealings are those business decisions which are made for the best in-
terest of the decision maker and not the corporation.
112. Id. at 1258-59. As is discussed in the following text of this comment, the
adoption of a golden parachute agreement necessitates the inquiry as to whether
the adoption was self-serving or in the best interest of the corporation and its
shareholders. While the business judgment rule provides for judicial deference of
corporate directors' business decisions, such decisions are presumed to be founded
on sound business judgment. Under this rule, a director will not be held liable
for mistakes in business judgment, if the mistakes are made in good faith and the
director believes that the decisions were made in the best interest of tile corpora-
tion.
It follows that those decisions that are self-serving do not serve tile best
interest of the corporation, and therefore, the director should not be given the
protection of the business judgment rule. As such, golden parachute agreements
are subjected to a stricter scrutiny in order to determine whether issues of
self-dealing arise.
113. See McGee, supra note 17 at 676.
114. See McGee, supra note 17 at 676. An executive has two separate roles
within the corporation, and as such must wear two hats. He wears the hat of the
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faced with this desire for entrenchment regardless of whether
or not the corporation is faced with a buyout." 5 In light of
this conflict of interest, the directors will find it very difficult
to remain purely objective in their decision-making."' The
court declared that because of the board's desire to remain en-
trenched, the directors' actions must withstand the scrutiny of
a threshold test before applying the business judgment
rule."'7
In the case that directors have adopted defense tactics
against buyouts, the threshold test (otherwise referred to as the
Unocal standard) is two-fold: The directors must show that "(1)
they had reasonable grounds to believe that a danger to corpo-
rate policy existed, which can be satisfied by a showing of good
faith and reasonable investigation, and (2) that the defensive
measure adopted is reasonable in relation to the threat
posed."" 8 Accordingly, if these two requirements are. met,
then the business judgment rule can be applied to the direc-
tors approving the golden parachute agreements."0 Thus the
court stated that the initial issue to consider is whether the
board intended to enact the golden parachutes as a defense
tactic. 120 If their intent is defensive, then the Unocal standard
would apply; otherwise not.121 With respect to International
Ins. Co., the court concluded that defense was not the intent
of PIP and as a result, it would not scrutinize the board's ac-
corporate executive who owes a duty of loyalty to the corporation and its share-
holders, and fie wears the hat of all employee of the corporation. As all employ-
ee, he seeks to satisfy his personal wants and needs, such as obtaining a high
salary and a comfortable work atmosphere. But situations arise in which the
executive has conflicting interests and must choose one hat or the other. In these
situations, tIle executive's duty of loyalty dictates that lie act in good faith and
refrain from using his position to further his personal interests. In addition, if he
seeks to further his personal interests lie mnust make a full disclosure to tile
corporation which reveals his position and the conflict of interest that accompa-
nies it.
115. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1459.
116. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)
(quoting Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962)).
117. Id. at 954.
118. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1459 (quoting Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d
946, 955 as cited in Tate & Lyle PLC v. Stalcy Continental Inc., [1987-1988 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 1 93,764 at 98,585, 1988 WL 46064 (Del. Ch.
May 9, 1988)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1459-60.
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tion under the Unocal two-part test.22
The second obstacle to the application of the business
judgment rule concerns self-interested transactions. If the com-
pensation plan is such that it only serves the personal interest
of the directors that approve it, the plan shall be voidable.
23
In this situation, the court said that the board must show good
faith and adequate consideration to the corporation so as to
avoid the action's classification as corporate waste. 24 Howev-
er, the court described two situations in which self-dealings do
not foreclose the court from review under the business judg-
ment rule. 1 5 These situations are (1) a disinterested board
or a majority of the shareholders approve the director's
self-interested plan, 126 and (2) when a board passes or adopts
a plan upon the recommendation of a committee of disinter-
ested directors. 27 Recommendation by a disinterested com-
mittee is prima facie evidence that the adoption was disinter-
ested and subject to the business judgment rule. 28 Regard-
ing the adoption of PIP, the court found that both of these
conditions were met and that the business judgment rule
should apply as a result.
129
b. Application Under Corporate Waste Framework
Once the initial obstacles have been satisfied, the court
will scrutinize the golden parachute within the corporate waste
framework. Because of the deference typically given corporate
directors under the business judgment rule courts are not will-
ing to call upon a director to explain his actions in the absence
of corporate waste. 30 Corporate waste is found when there
is a showing of an abuse of discretion, fraud, bad faith, or ille-
122. Id. at 1460.
123. Id. (citing Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 909 A.2d 652,
655 (1952)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. "If this ratification occurs, the court will review the implementation of
the action under the business judgment rule." Id.
127. Id. "When golden parachutes are adopted by subcommittees composed of
'disinterested' outside directors, courts will generally not make a self-dealing
inquiry." See Note, Golden Parachutes, supra note 7, at 965 & n.4 8 .
128. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1460.
129. Id. at 1461.
130. Id. at 1459 (citing Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933)). See supra
text accompanying notes 57-64.
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gality, and unless one of these four factors can be found, the
court will apply the business judgment rule. 3' The second
obstacle to the application of the business judgment rule is
illustrative of the bad faith factor, but it can be rebutted by a
showing that disinterested directors recommended the golden
parachute agreement.3 2 In fact, the International Ins. Co.
court stated that a compensation plan is not considered corpo-
rate waste if the plan bears a reasonable relationship to the consid-
eration received by the corporation.'
The court determined that this "reasonable relationship"
test is comprised of three inquiries. First, the court must deter-
mine whether the corporation received the benefit of its bar-
gain. If the corporation received nothing in exchange for the
benefit conferred, then the plan constitutes corporate waste.
Second, the court should then determine that if the corpora-
tion did receive some benefit, whether the compensation was
so disproportionate that a reasonable person would not think
that the corporation had received any benefit, or quid pro
quo.3 4 If no quid pro quo resulted from the exchange, then
the compensation payments would constitute no more than a
corporate gift, and may be classified as corporate waste if un-
reasonable. Third, the court must decide whether the services
performed by the employee triggered the payments. In other
words, the court must find that the motive for adopting the
plan was compensation for services rendered or because of
some other purpose.3 5
Finally, the International Ins. Co. court concluded that PIP
bore a reasonable relationship to the benefits received by the
corporation.' Southwest intended first, to retain its key em-
ployees during the five years of uncertainty to follow the adop-
tion due to the excessive number of bank mergers taking
place, and second, to insure that the corporation's key exec-
utives would continue to act in the best interest of the corpora-
131. Intem Tyional Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1461.
132. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
133. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1461.
134. "[Quid pro quo] is nothing more than the mutual consideration which
passes between the parties to a contract, and which renders it valid and binding."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1123 (5th ed. 1979).
135. hIternational Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1461.
136. Id. at 1469.
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tion if faced with a buyout.' Southwest's needs were sub-
stantial, and PIP was designed to address them.138 Relying on
the same analysis, the court determined that the consultation
agreement adopted for Johns did not constitute corporate
waste.
39
III. ANALYSIS
A. Analysis of Obstacles to the Application of the Business
Judgment Rule
As discussed above, International Ins. Co. set forth two ob-
stacles to the application of the business judgment rule to
golden parachute agreements."4 These obstacles reflect, to
some extent, the attitude of Congress regarding golden
parachutes. Not only did Congress intend to discourage the
use of golden parachute agreements because they hinder ac-
quisition activity, but Congress was also concerned that the
presence of a golden parachute may encourage key executives
to support a takeover that is not in the best interest of the
corporation in order to take advantage of the parachute pay-
ments.
141
1. Use of Golden Parachutes as a Defense Tactic
The first obstacle entails the use of golden parachutes as a
defense tactic to corporate takeover. 42 It is encouraging that
this particular use of golden parachutes is withheld from the
protection of the business judgment rule. Not only has Con-
gress indicated its strong disapproval of golden parachute
agreements, but commentary suggests that such agreements do
little more than provide key executives with large sums of
money at the shareholders' expense without actually discourag-
ing prospective buyers to any significant degree. 43 Since
these agreements represent but a small fraction of the total
purchase price of the corporation, no investor will likely be dis-
137. Id. at 1462.
138. See id. at 1463-60.
139. Id. at 1470.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
141. See supra note 7 & notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
142. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1458.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
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couraged and subsequently, the shareholder will inevitably
shoulder the burden of the compensation agreement.'
In International Ins. Co. v. Johns, the court used the Unocal
standard, but it is unclear from the opinion whether the court
in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.1' 5 was meant to reflect
Congress' view146 of golden parachutes. Nonetheless, the
Unocal standard'47 and the Joint Committee's General Expla-
nation coincide and are subsequently adopted by the court in
International Ins. Co. Even though the court in International Ins.
Co. states that Florida law dictates that the business judgment
rule be used to determine the propriety of the golden para-
chute agreements, such application is tempered by the Unocal
standard. Interestingly, Unocal was decided in the Delaware
courts, which apply the business judgment rule liberally. The
subsequent adoption of this standard in a federal court may
perpetuate the liberal application of the business judgment
rule as it was interpreted by the Delaware court in Unocal. 4'
As discussed above, if the court determines that the gold-
en parachute was adopted as a defense tactic, then the direc-
tors must show that they had reasonable grounds to believe
that a danger to corporate policy existed, and that a golden
parachute agreement is reasonable in light of the threat
posed. 4 ' This test uses a very subjective standard, requiring
a case by case analysis. In International Ins. Co., the court
brushed this question aside in a preliminary determination
that the golden parachute agreements were not adopted for
purposes of takeover defense. The court stated that, to the
144. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
145. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
146. Congress' view on the use of golden parachutes for purposes of a take-
over defense is reflected in the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation
of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. See JOINT COM-
MITTEE, supra note 47.
147. See supra text accompanying note 118.
148. Even though the court uses Delaware's approach, it cannot be interpreted
as a federal approach since the court is relying on Florida state law in this action.
The court's justification for using Delaware's approach is as a matter of Florida
precedent. It states, "[w]e rely with confidence upon Delaware law to construe
Florida corporate law. The Florida courts have relied upon Delaware corporate law
to establish their own corporate doctrines." International fis. Co., 874 F.2d at 1459
n.22.
149. Id. at 1449 (quoting Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955 as cited in Tate &
Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep
(CCHI) § 93,764 at 98,585, 1988 WL 46064 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988)).
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contrary, PIP was adopted as an incentive to management in
order to encourage higher performance, and when adopted,
no takeover was even contemplated.
150
In Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 5' the golden parachute
agreements were undoubtedly adopted in anticipation of a
takeover, since they were proposed following a hostile tender
offer 152 and were subsequently presented to the shareholders
as part of the merger proposal. 153 However, the facts do not
indicate that the agreements were proposed for purposes of a
takeover defense. On the contrary, the agreements were pro-
posed for the purpose of providing for a smoother takeover
transition which actually supports such a takeover.
But how strictly will the Unocal standard be applied? The
directors must show that they had reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that a danger to corporate policy existed, which can be
satisfied by a showing of good faith and reasonable investiga-
tion, and that the defensive measure adopted is reasonable in
relation to the threat posed,'54 but they need only address
these issues when the golden parachute has been adopted as a
defense tactic. If the board of directors is aware of the Unocal
standard, the golden parachute will not be introduced in the
board meeting minutes as the defense to a pending merger.
Instead, the board can carefully avoid the standard by stating
within the minutes that the golden parachutes are adopted in
an effort to insure a smooth merger in case one comes to pass.
This was the rationale used by the Natomas Corporation's
board in Gaillard v. Natomas Co., and nothing in the court's
opinion indicates that the truth of this rationale was scruti-
nized. Unless other relevant factors, such as the timing of its
adoption and the amount of the golden parachute payments,
are used to determine the purpose of the golden parachute
agreement's adoption, then the Unocal standard is useless.
In addition, the courts are in a position to avoid the appli-
cation of the Unocal standard if they so choose. Facially, the
Unocal standard has some bite, but the courts can simply ad-
dress the issue and move on to the an application of the busi-
150. Id. at 1451.
151. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1989).
152. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
153. GaillMa, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
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ness judgment rule. With the gaps in its application, the Unocal
standard is impressive only upon first glance.
2. When Issues of Self-Dealing Arise
The second obstacle is encountered when golden para-
chutes are awarded to members of the board who are inside
directors. 155 In this situation, the court must determine
whether the directors are acting on their own behalf or on
behalf of the corporation and its shareholders.' 56 If an adopt-
ed compensation plan serves the personal interest of the direc-
tors that approve it, it shall be voidable. 57 However, if a plan
is approved by a disinterested board or a majority of the share-
holders, then the golden parachute is not voidable. In this lat-
ter situation, the actions of the directors are protected by the
business judgment rule. In International Ins. Co., the court de-
termined that these conditions were met and that the actions
of the directors were thereby subject to the protection of the
business judgment rule.1 58
Congress seems to support this obstacle as well. The Joint
Committee's General Explanation of the Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984 states that the committee was concerned that the exis-
tence of these golden parachute agreements may actually en-
courage top management to support a takeover that is not in
the best interest of the corporation in order to take advantage
of its parachute payments. 59 Congress suggests that such ar-
rangements should be strongly discouraged,6 ° and to some
extent, this second obstacle helps to prevent such a situation.
However, on second review, differences between the sec-
ond obstacle and Congress' view become apparent. While Con-
gress appears to be concerned with the effect of golden para-
chutes on the mind of the recipient executive, the International
Ins. Co. court was concerned with the actual adoption of the
golden parachute agreement and the state of mind of those
who adopt it. Advocates of this second approach might argue
155. See supna note 5 and accompanying t,:xt.
156. International Ins. Co., 874 F.2d at 1458.
157. Id. at 1460 (citing Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d
652, 655 (1952)).
158. Id. at 1461.
159. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supia note 47, at 199.
160. See JOINT COMMITTEE, slipro note 47, at 199-200.
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that if the adoption of the golden parachute is not self-serving,
then the agreement will provide only reasonable compensation
for the executive who will then presumably act in the best in-
terest of the corporation. This argument suggests that an
agreement that provides only reasonable compensation would
not tempt an executive to support an unfavorable takeover,
and as such, no conflict of interest would arise.
Realistically though, an interested executive is likely to
lobby for the most beneficial compensation plan he can get. In
addition, it is unlikely that disinterested directors will know
when such a plan will provide enough compensation to the
executive to encourage him to remain with the company, but
not so much that he will support the takeover in order to real-
ize the benefits of the agreement. In this situation, the busi-
ness judgment rule provides the protection necessary for disin-
terested directors to make competent decisions without fear of
judicial reprisal should their decision turn out to be inappro-
priate in hindsight.
Perhaps the presence of this uncertainty is the reason why
Congress strongly discourages the use of golden parachutes
through the tax law. Determining whether an executive will act
in the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders or
whether he will act only for his own interest is difficult, if not
impossible. An executive who is party to a golden parachute
agreement may be more inclined to act in a self-serving man-
ner, and since his support is theoretically based on his own
personal assessment of the benefits of the takeover, no one
can legitimately substantiate an accusation of bad faith.
Congress' solution to this dilemma is to strongly discourage
the use of golden parachutes by imposing adverse tax conse-
quences on the parties to golden parachute agreements with
very large payments.' 6' Apparently, Congress feels that the
best solution is to remove the temptation and what it perceives
as the source of the conflict. Hence, without the presence of
the golden parachute agreement, an executive will not have
the incentive to support an unfavorable takeover and therefore
no conflict of interest will arise.
Within the confines of its power to tax,6 2 Congress had
161. See supa text accompanying notes 142-48.
162. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, c. I states: "[t]he Congress shall have Power to
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made the first step toward discouraging the use of golden
parachutes. If a board of directors adopts a golden parachute
that is too large or in violation of the securities laws, the cor-
poration and the beneficiary will suffer adverse tax conse-
quences. The tax laws adopted by Congress do not discourage
the use of all golden parachutes, but only those so large that
they are more likely to create a conflict of interest. Congress'
solution, however, is not the solution chosen by the court in
International Ins. Co.
The International Ins. Co. court used an approach which
seeks to determine the subjective state of mind of those who
have adopted the compensation agreement. An analysis of
"self-dealing" is subjective insofar as it involves the director's
state of mind and who he seeks to benefit by his actions. But
since determining the director's subjective state of mind is
nearly impossible, the court used objective standards to mea-
sure the board's actions in order to determine whether self-
dealing has taken place. The court determined that approval of
the compensation plan by a disinterested board or majority of
shareholders was admitted as prima facie evidence that the
adoption was not for the purpose of self-dealing. In this case,
the business judgment rule would be used.
In Gaillard, while the five interested directors prepared
and presented the golden parachute and consultation agree-
ments to a disinterested compensation committee, the plans
were approved by twelve disinterested directors sitting on the
board following a recommendation by such committee.'6 As
a result, the court determined that the business judgment rule
should apply. Under International Ins. Co. analysis, because the
plans were approved by a disinterested board and the interest-
ed directors did not vote, the court determined this was prima
facie evidence that no self-dealing took place. Thus, the actions
of the directors were subject to the protection of the business
judgment rule and the analysis that accompanies it.
The International Ins. Co. decision draws a sharp line be-
tween interested directors and disinterested directors, which is
founded on direct benefit, that should disturb the reader. The
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the Common Defence and general welfare of the United States."
163. Gaillard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
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assumption is that if the director stands to benefit financially,
he is an interested director, while the director who will not
benefit financially is disinterested. This is a black and white
determination by the court; there is no grey. This assumption
is ridiculous insofar as benefits do not have to be financial or
immediate. One would hope that the distinction could be
drawn so easily, but that is not a realistic approach. The courts
have admitted that a golden parachute should be voidable
when it is adopted by a self-dealing director, but otherwise not.
The grey area is being ignored here, and in order to address
the true nature of the problems surrounding golden parachute
agreements, the courts must realize that the problems arise
from the size and nature of the golden parachutes themselves.
Congress has addressed the problem from this angle, as should
the courts. Of course, the question of self-dealing is only a
preliminary question, but this discussion illustrates the scope
of the problem and how the courts have chosen to ignore it.
B. Corporate Waste and Protection under the Business Judgment
Rule
Once the court determines that the golden parachute was
not adopted for an improper purpose, the court will analyze
the directors' decision within the context of the business judg-
ment rule. The court in International Ins. Co., in other words,
determined that absent a showing of corporate waste, 6 4 it
will not question the director's decision or require that the
director explain his action in any way. 6 5 To that end, a com-
pensation plan is not considered corporate waste if it bears a
reasonable relationship to the consideration received by the
corporation."'
As discussed in the preceding text, "7 the "reasonable re-
lationship" test seeks to determine whether the corporation
has received the benefit of its bargain. Therefore, the compen-
sation agreement is considered reasonable if it conferred a
benefit to the executive that is not disproportionate to that
164. See supra text accompanying note 131.
165. International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1459 (citing Rogers v. Hill,
289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933)).
166. Id. at 1461.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
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received by the corporation. When the benefits conferred are
obviously disproportionate, such that the agreement in no way
benefits the corporation and its shareholders, the director's
decision is considered a blatant error in judgment and he will
not be protected under the business judgment rule. In this
case, the director would be liable to the corporation for the
loss incurred by it as a consequence of the director's mistake.
As discussed in preceding text, advocates of golden para-
chutes maintain that golden parachutes serve to eliminate any
conflict of interest that might otherwise arise in the absence of
such an agreement16 and that they help to attract key execu-
tives and retain them in the face of a takeover battle,'69
thereby helping to maintain managerial stability in the face of
such a takeover. 1
70
These types of goals, however, are easy to defend beneath
the deferential scrutiny of the business judgment rule. In fact,
the burden of proof required of someone claiming corporate
waste is very high in light of the reasonable relationship test.
The corporate directors claim that they are seeking to provide
managerial stability and that golden parachutes are a reason-
able means to that end. Directors may even claim that the
agreements are necessary to maintain stability. Yet the reason-
able relationship test looks only to the goals and benefit at the
time of adoption, and ignores the actual affect of the golden
parachute. As mentioned above, the business judgment rule
provides that if a corporate director's decision can be support-
ed by any reasonable goal, however lofty, such a decision will
be set aside without scrutiny. Unfortunately, the reasonable
relationship test fails to take into account that the executive
who is party to a golden parachute agreement may not be as
concerned with the stability of the management as he is with
the benefits he may receive. In fact, this is one of the primary
concerns addressed by Congress.'
7 1
Opponents argue that the risk of top executives leaving
their jobs is unlikely since company loyalty, personal pride, and
the potential for an unfavorable reputation serve to keep top
168. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 205-06.
169. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 204.
170. See Comment, Draconian Measums, supra note 8, at 1296.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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executives where they are. 7' Others contend that golden
parachutes will do more than ease -executive tension but go so
far as to create a lackadaisical or apathetic attitude on the part
of the executive, who is assured of financial gain regardless of
the outcome of the takeover.' Ironically, the business judg-
ment rule is designed to protect an innocent director from
liability in situations such as this. An innocent director will not
know when an executive is properly motivated by a golden
parachute or when the executive will take advantage of a situa-
tion because the payments are too much. As a result, the busi-
ness judgment rule is an attempt to protect an innocent direc-
tor from liability for what may be deemed a bad decision with
the aid of hindsight. Directors cannot ascertain the intentions
of the executive who is a party to the golden parachute, but
have only an expectation that the executive will act in the best
interest of the corporation. The problem with using the busi-
ness judgment rule in the context of golden parachutes lies
within this difficult situation. In an effort to protect the inno-
cent director, the less than innocent directors slip through as
well and avoid liability. These directors, though they receive no
immediate financial reward, may receive some future benefit
from the inside directors for whom the golden parachutes
were approved. As such, the outside director benefits political-
ly. Once again, the simple black and white classification of
directors fails to resolve the true problems at hand.
In Gaillard, golden parachute agreements were provided
for four inside directors as part of a friendly merger agree-
ment following a hostile tender offer.'74 Even though the dis-
interested members of the board of directors approved the
compensation agreements upon the recommendation of the
compensation committee, the court determined that the gold-
en parachutes did not serve any of the traditional functions by
which such agreements are normally justified. 7 ' The com-
pensation committee relied upon the advice of their outside coun-
sel, 176 who stated that it was common practice, in mergers, to
172. See Hood & Benge, supta note 10, at 205.
173. See Hood & Benge, supra note 10, at 206.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
175. Gaillard v. Natomas Co. 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 1270, 256 Cal. Rptr. 702,
714 (1989). See supfa notes 8, 10 & 11, and notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
176. The outside counsel in this case, Joseph H. Florn, is the senior partner of
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adopt arrangements in order to ensure continuity of manage-
ment and provide economic protection for those key employ-
ees who might be affected. 77 The opinion does not indicate
that Natomas' outside counsel suggested the golden parachutes
were necessary in this case, and apparently the compensation
committee did not bother to inquire into this matter fur-
ther.17
8
Even within the extremely deferential scrutiny of the busi-
ness judgment rule, a corporate director is subject to a duty of
reasonable inquiry. 79 It is also true that a director may rely
on the advice of counsel when the subject area is within such
counsel's expertise. 80  But because the golden parachutes
were prepared by the outside counsel who recommended that
they be adopted,'' and because the same outside counsel
drafted the golden parachute agreements at the request of
Natomas' chief executive officer who was party to his own
golden parachute agreement, 8 2 the outside directors must
have realized that outside counsel was at least somewhat bi-
ased. Upon reasonable inquiry, outside directors may have dis-
covered that the benefits of golden parachute agreements to
the corporation are in controversy and that just because their
outside counsel says that golden parachutes are commonly
used in mergers does not mean that they should be used. In-
stead, the outside directors accepted their outside counsel's
recommendation without reasonable inquiry, and the golden
parachutes were adopted.
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flout. He is an attorney of high repute who
specializes in corporate takeovers and mergers. His support of a particular course
of action in the context of a corporate merger is undoubtedly valuable, but it
cannot relieve a corporate director of liability or his duty of inquiry.
177. Gaillard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1261, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 708; see supra note
85 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
179. Section 309 of California's Corporate Code provides in part that:
(a) A director shall perform the duties of a director, including duties
as a member of any committee of the board upon which the director
may serve, in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in
the best interests of the coiporation and with such care, including reason-
able inquity, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
under similar circumstances.
See supra note 79 for this code section reproduced in whole (emphasis added).
180. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
181. Gaillard, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1259-61, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
182. Id.
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Shortly after the merger, the four key executives who re-
ceived the golden parachute agreements terminated their em-
ployment, thus triggering the lump sum payments which to-
talled about ten million dollars.' In addition, the one inside
director who received the consultation agreement spent less
than a day providing consultation services during the pre-
scribed four year period.8 4 Despite the questionable circum-
stances under which the recipients obtained their benefits, the
executives/inside directors who received payments did not
violate the agreement by voluntarily terminating their employ-
ment. The golden parachutes provided that they could termi-
nate their employment for good reason within six months fol-
lowing the merger." 5 Following the six-month period, the re-
cipients could terminate their employment for any reason and
still receive payments under the plan. In fact, the payment
would actually be reduced according to the length of time they
remained employees of Natomas following the six-month peri-
od. 8  Such a reduction in payments may have even encour-
aged these executives to terminate their employment as quickly
as possible. With this kind of incentive to leave, it is doubtful
that the golden parachutes would have helped to facilitate a
smoother transition beyond the six-month period.
Not only did the committee fail to define the purpose for
which the golden parachutes were being provided and the ben-
efit received by the corporation, but the agreements were actu-
ally designed to encourage the executives to terminate their
employment. This situation raises a fundamental problem that
has been overlooked by commentators in the past, but which
becomes apparent by this case in point.
C. Subjective Problems of Analysis Overlooked
The fundamental problem with the court's analysis is that
it applies objective standards of review to the subjective intent
of the parties involved. This practice, however, is common,
since subjective intent is all but impossible to actually deter-
mine. The difference in this case is that the objective analysis is
183. Id. at 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1259-60, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
186. Id. at 1260, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
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too far removed from the true nature of the problem. The
court uses an objective analysis to determine the subjective
intent of those directors who adopted the golden parachutes,
while the amount of the golden parachutes was subjectively
chosen by the directors for the purpose of affecting the execu-
tive to the extent that it eliminates his conflict of interest. This
situation becomes more clear by the following illustration.
When outside directors are approached by inside directors
with a proposal for a compensation agreement such as a gold-
en parachute, the outside directors should theoretically assume
an objective stance whereby they evaluate the propriety of the
proposed agreement and the benefit which the agreement will
confer upon the corporation and its shareholders. In reality,
this objectivity may not occur for two reasons.
For one, outside directors, in many cases, are not only
dependent upon the inside directors for providing essential
information regarding the operations and needs of the corpo-
ration, but they may also be indebted to the inside directors
insofar as the inside directors may have helped them secure a
position on the board in the first place.' This type of sub-
jectivity may not be present in all situations, but in those cases
in which it is present, an outside director may find it very diffi-
cult to remain purely objective with respect to the compensa-
tion to be given an inside director who is a close colleague and
perhaps a good friend.
This situation is precisely that which the present line of
inquiry fails to anticipate. As long as the golden parachute
agreements are approved by the "disinterested" directors of
the board, and the compensation is not so disproportionate as
to constitute corporate waste through the reasonable relation-
ship test, then the deferential business judgment rule is ap-
plied. The business judgment rule, however, requires little jus-
tification to pass beneath the scrutiny of the court.
Essentially, the court has assumed that the categorization
of a director as "disinterested" insures that he will make his
decisions in an objective manner. Yet such a categorization
may be unwarranted. To assume that a disinterested director
187. Interview with Gary S. Vandeweglie, Esq. Gary S. Vandeweghe is a senior
partner of Rankin, Oneal, Center, Luckhardt & Lund, a law office based in San
Jose, California (Dec. 18, 1989).
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will act objectively because he has no direct personal or finan-
cial interest is tantamount to assuming that an executive, who
has secured the benefits of a golden parachute agreement, will
undoubtedly act in the best interest of the corporation, since
his loyalty is untainted by any measurable conflict on interest.
Congress may have anticipated this lack of objectivity sur-
rounding golden parachutes when enacting the relevant sec-
tion of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. Congress was con-
cerned that the existence of golden parachute agreements may
actually encourage key executives to support takeovers not in
the best interest of the corporation and shareholders in order
to take advantage of the parachute payments.18 8 Congress
consequently determined that some of these arrangements
should be strongly discouraged.' Specifically, very large
golden parachutes should be discouraged since that are more
likely to encourage illegitimate behavior.
When disinterested corporate directors adopt golden para-
chute agreements, they usually justify them with the traditional
yet unverified arguments of those who favor their use. Howev-
er, by applying the business judgment rule in this situation the
decisions of these corporate directors are sheltered from any
substantial scrutiny by the courts. If fact, the burden of proof
is so great as to make a suit against these directors nearly im-
possible. In essence, courts have given corporate directors the
red carpet treatment regarding most of their decisions. One
must go as far as to show bad faith or fraud in order to over-
turn a board's decision. Congress' solution is to impose ad-
verse tax consequences to discourage the use of certain golden
parachute agreements. The courts, on the other hand, have
done nothing to discourage their use.
The business judgment rule was developed with a legiti-
mate concern in mind. Directors should be protected from
liability when their good faith decisions turn out to be wrong.
This comment is not meant to dispute that proposition. But
golden parachute agreements present a new realm of contro-
versial issues, which the business judgment rule is unequipped
to handle. The adoption of golden parachutes by corporate
directors presents conflicts of interest and self-dealing issues
188. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 47, at 199.
189. See JOINT COMMITTEE, sufpm note 47, at 199-200.
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that are complex and subjective. Generally, the business judg-
ment rule is appropriate since the board's decisions do not
necessarily have an impact on the individual directors. As such,
we assume the decisions are made in good faith. But in the
case of golden parachute agreements, the individual directors
may be impacted personally and politically. As a result, courts
should not defer to a board's decisions so quickly. Rules must
be developed in order to provide both corporate directors and
the courts with clear guidelines for the adoption of golden
parachutes.
IV. PROPOSAL
The first obstacle to the application of the business judg-
ment rule, presented by the International Ins. Co. court,"9 ° is
practical, effective and does not need to be changed. The sec-
ond obstacle, however, is flawed and must be modified."'
The second obstacle provides that the compensation plan shall
be voidable if it only serves the personal interest of the direc-
tors that approve it.' 2 In order to avoid being classified as
corporate waste, the board must show good faith and adequate
consideration to the corporation.' The obstacle is flawed
only with respect to the two exceptions to this rule. These ex-
ceptions are when a disinterested board or a majority of the
shareholders approve the plan,' and when a board passes
or adopts a plan upon the recommendation of a committee of
disinterested directors.'95 These exceptions provide evidence
that the adoption was disinterested and therefore subject to
the business judgment rule.9 6 These exceptions should be
dismissed. As previously discussed, it is not clear when a direc-
tor is "interested" or "disinterested" since immediate financial
gain is only one of many ways in which a director may have a
190. The first obstacle concerns the use of golden parachutes as a defense tac-
tic to an unwanted takeover. See supra notes 7, 29 & 30, and notes 110 & 113-22
and accompanying text.
191. Th'e second obstacle concerns self dealings by corporate director with re-
spect to golden parachutes. See supra notes 111-12 & 123-29 and accompanying
text.
192. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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personal stake in the decision. The two exceptions ignore the
reality of the situation and assume objectivity where there may
be none.
The second obstacle, as modified, should state, "If the
compensation plan is such that, at the time it is adopted, it only
serves the personal interest of the directors that approve it, the
plan shall be voidable." It is enough that if a plaintiff can show
that, at the time of its adoption, a golden parachute serves
only the personal interests of the directors that approved it,
then such golden parachute agreements should be voidable.
The burden of proof, in this case, is quite enough since any
benefit conferred upon the corporation would be enough to
overcome the obstacle and move on to the general rule.
Generally though, the business judgment rule is not the
proper instrument by which to measure the propriety of gold-
en parachute agreements, since the rule provides insufficient
protection against conflicts of interest and self-dealing by direc-
tors and officers. In fact, the benefits conferred upon corpora-
tions by golden parachutes scarcely justify their use to any ex-
tent. The strongest argument supporting these compensation
agreements, which is that they help to attract executives from
other companies and retain key corporate executives that are
already employed, is tantamount to supporting bribery. Loyal
and reliable executives should be sufficiently compensated in
the first place. Thus far, the courts have refused to face the
real issues behind the use of golden parachutes, and conse-
quently have adopted an ineffective approach which perpetu-
ates the problem of unjustified benefits to corporate executives
at the expense of the shareholder.
In order to solve the problems resulting from the adop-
tion of golden parachute agreements, the judiciary or state
legislatures should develop clear guidelines regarding their
disposition. The following is an example of such guidelines
through legislation:
(a) As used in this section, "golden parachute" shall
mean any agreement which provides a corporate employee
with compensation, whether monetary or otherwise, by
lump-sum or installment, upon ternhination of clployment
following a change of control.
197
197. The rule would have to contain additional dcfinitions regarding the inea-
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(b) Subject to provisions of subsection (c), corporate
directors shall not be held liable for the adoption of a
golden parachute when such director believes the golden
parachute to be in the best interest of the corporation and
has exercised such care, including reasonable inquiry, as
an ordinary prudent person in a like position would under
similar circumstances. 9 8
(c) The following rebuttable presumptions, affecting
the burden of proof, shall be used to determine whether a
golden parachute was adopted by a director in the best
interest of the corporation:
(1) The decision to make payments pursuant to a
golden parachute which amount to less than or equal to
double the recipient's annualized salary, are presumed to
be made in the best interest of the corporation.
(2) The decision to make payments pursuant to a
golden parachute which amount to more than double the
recipient's annualized salary, are presumed not to be made
in the best interest of the corporation.
(d) Golden parachutes are voidable when a court of
law of this jurisdiction holds that such golden parachute
was not adopted in the best interest of the corporation for
which the board sits.
(e) Directors, who vote to adopt a golden parachute
subsequently held, by a court of law of this jurisdiction,
not to have been adopted in the best interest of the corpo-
ration for which the board sits, are liable to the corpora-
tion for the losses resulting fiom such adoption.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress has suggested that the use of golden parachutes
should be "strongly discouraged" in order to prevent the abus-
es which can develop as a result of their use. In an effort to
remain entrenched, management may seek to discourage a
takeover by bidding up the cost of such a takeover by way of a
golden parachute agreement. In addition, some fear that exec-
sure of compensation with respect to time (present value), termination of employ-
ment, and change of control. Some of these provisions are described in the pre-
ceding text of this comment. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
198. This section should be expanded as necessary to include any additional
parts of the business judgment rule that are relevant to corporate decision making
(e.g., reliance on certain unbiased individuals for information necessary for an
educated decision).
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utives may take advantage of a golden parachute agreement by
favoring takeovers that do not serve the best interest of the
corporation and its shareholders.
The court's solution is the application of the business
judgment rule following a preliminary inquiry into the purpose
for adoption of the golden parachute. But as this comment has
pointed out, the court's solution is flawed. Not only has the
court given outside directors the red carpet treatment through
a meager line of scrutiny, but it has failed to consider the hu-
man element, that is, the fact that there is no guarantee that
inside directors will act as is anticipated following the adoption
of the golden parachute.
The fact that these golden parachutes remain a common
practice does not justify their use to any degree. Apparently
the courts have disregarded a perpetual wrong, despite
Congress' strong discouragement of the use of these golden
parachutes. Congress graciously paved the road that the court
chose not to follow. Not only did a federal court fail to follow
such a path, but essentially the court condoned the use of
golden parachutes for the future.
Golden parachute agreements are, in most cases, no more
than an unjustified financial drain on the shareholders' equity,
and they have no place in corporations. They reflect an abuse
of power by those who are supposed to represent the best
interests of the corporate shareholders, and only with clearly
established guidelines can this abuse of power be controlled.
The proposed legislation, set forth above, is a viable solution
to the problems inherent in golden parachute agreements. By
shifting the burden of proof and challenging the judgment of
corporate directors with respect to golden parachutes, the
abuse will subside. The present method of deference given
corporate directors in this area is offensive and this scrutiny
must be modified.
Mark A. Heyl
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